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The Archaeological Resources Protection Act
- Twenty Five Years Later
Roberto Iraola'
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, there was exten-
sive looting of museums and archaeological sites in Iraq.1 This
conduct was swiftly condemned and in the United States legisla-
tion was introduced in both the House and the Senate providing
for import restrictions regarding cultural and archaeological ma-
terials from Iraq.2 The looting of archaeological sites is a lucra-
tive and old business.' In the United States, one estimate indi-
cates that a third of the approximately 2,000,000 sites located in
federally owned lands have been looted." In some parts of the
* Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Secu-
rity, Department of the Interior. J.D., Catholic University Law School (1983). The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. See, e.g., Micah Garen, Looting Continues at Archaeological Sites Around Iraq,
BAGHDAD BULLETIN, Jun. 24, 2003, available at http:www.baghdadbulletin.com/pageArti-
cle.php?articleid=39&catjid=25 ("After the recent war, the looting reached a fevered pitch.
Important sites such as Isin, Umma, Umma Akrab and Larsa were turned into swiss
cheese by teams of looters, reportedly up to 200 to 300 strong at times."); Dan Vergano,
Expedition Verifies Looting of Iraqi Ruins, Museums, USA TODAY, Jun. 11, 2003 ("Ground
surveys of 23 sites revealed serious looting at 14 ancient cities, and a helicopter survey of
13 sites in southern Iraq found serious looting at 10 locations."); Edmund L. Andrews, On
Iraqi Highways, Artifacts for Sale, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 29, 2003 ("After American
forces first entered Baghdad, looters raided Iraq's major museums and its main library,
which is a repository for thousands of cuneiform tablets.")
2. See Legislating Protection for Iraqi Heritage, ARCHAEOLOGY, Jun. 27, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.archaeology.orglmagazine.php?page=onlinelfeatures/iraqHR2009 (discussing
differences between H.R. 2009 ("Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act") and S. 1291
("Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2003")).
3. See Glenna J. Sheveland, Note, Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Cultural Resource
Laws in Criminal Prosecution for Theft of Archaeological and Cultural Resources from
Federal Lands, 28 N.E. J. CRIM & CIV. CON. 27, 29 (2002) (noting that in the United States,
by the late 1700s and early 1800s, there was a dramatic shift from "attempts to provide
scientific understanding of archaeological sites to the outright looting and vandalizing of
these sites solely for commercial gain") (footnote omitted); Stephanie A. Ades, Comment,
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act: A New Application in the Private Property
Context, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 599 (1995) ("Archaeological looting and trafficking is a lucra-
tive and thriving business in the United States with a growing international market for
Native American artifacts.") (footnotes omitted).
4. See Sheveland, supra note 3, at 54. The two million figure may be conservative;
some archaeologists estimate the number of sites on Indian and federal lands at six to
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country, law enforcement officials maintain that the theft and il-
legal trafficking of archaeological resources ranks fourth behind
drugs, guns and money laundering.5
In the late 1970s, the danger to American archaeological re-
sources from looters, particularly in the Southwest, reached sig-
nificant proportions and, given the deficiencies of existing federal
law, led in 1979 to the passage of the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act ("ARPA" or the "Act").6 Now twenty-five years old,
ARPA has been one of the principal federal laws used to protect
archaeological resources.7 This Article, which is divided into two
parts, examines the few reported decisions which have interpreted
some of the key criminal and civil penalty provisions under ARPA,
as well as the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to criminal
violations under the Act. First, the Article provides an overview of
ARPA's criminal and civil penalty provisions. The Article next
analyzes how courts have addressed legal challenges to some of
those provisions, including the application of the Sentencing
Guidelines, thereby providing a summary of the evolving case law
regarding the Act in these areas.
II. OVERVIEW
In 1979, Congress passed ARPA to protect archaeological re-
sources and sites8 found on Indian and public lands9 and to pro-
seven million. See Monograph, Trade in Illicit Antiquities: The Destruction of the World's
Archaeological Heritage, Chapter 11 Protecting the Past for the Future: Federal Archae-
ology in the United States (2001), at 97.
5. Kris Axtman, Archaeological Looting: U.S. Gets Tougher on Lucrative Crime,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 20, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor.conV2002/0620/
p02s02-usju.html.
6. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-mm (2002)). See Francis P. McManamon,
Cultural Resources and Protection Under United States Law, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 247, 265
(2001) ("In the 1970s, the threats to American archaeological resources from looting had
reached notorious proportions, especially in the Southwest. In response ... ARPA was...
enacted ... when difficulties in enforcing the Antiquities Act, and weaknesses in the pen-
alties provided by that law, became critical.") (footnotes omitted).
7. See McManamon, supra note 6, at 266 (noting that "[t]he primary impetus behind
ARPA was the need to provide more effective law enforcement to protect archaeological
sites.") Other statutes commonly used in the prosecution of archaeological related offenses
are 18 U.S.C. § 641 (theft) and 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (destruction of government property). See
Sheveland, supra note 3, at 57.
8. While not defined under the Act, it is generally understood that "[a]n archaeological
'site' is an area in which some human activity has occurred in the past. The site is usually
defined on the basis of artifacts and features remaining at the location, and resulting from
human activity." Norbert L. Bartochowski, Comment, Takings, Archaeological Sites, and
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mote the study and evaluation of these resources through in-
creased cooperation between governmental authorities, the profes-
sional archaeological community, and private individuals."0 To
assist in implementing its provisions, the Act directed the De-
Artifacts, 8 ALB L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 134, 135 (2002). An archaeological resource is defined
under the statute as:
any material remains of past human life or activities which are of archaeological in-
terest, as determined under uniform regulations .... Such regulations containing
such determination shall include, but not be limited to: pottery, basketry, bottles,
weapons, weapon projectiles, tools, structures or portions of structures, pit houses,
rock paintings, rock carvings, intaglios, graves, human skeletal materials, or any por-
tion or piece of any of the foregoing items .... No item shall be treated as an archaeo-
logical resource under regulations ... unless such item is at least 100 years of age.
16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1). Paleontological specimens are excluded "unless found in an archaeo-
logical context" which mean the specimens must have been worked on by humans and be at
least 100 years old. Id. See generally David J. Lazerwitz, Note, Bones of Contention: The
Regulation of Paleontological Resources on the Federal Public Lands, 69 IND. L. J. 601, 605-
06 (1994) (discussing differences between paleontological and archaeological resources).
Arrowheads found on the ground also are excepted from the criminal and civil penalty
provisions of the Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(g), 470ffia)(3). Lastly, to the extent that rocks,
bullets, coins or minerals are not defined as archaeological resources under pertinent
agency regulations (see footnote 11, infra), they are exempt from the provisions of the Act.
16 U.S.C. § 470kk(b). See generally Kristine 0. Rogers, Visigoths Revisited: The Prosecu-
tion of Archaeological Resource Thieves, Traffickers, and Vandals, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LIB. 47,
74 (1987) (noting how the exemptions identified above are illusory since 'items will most
assuredly be found in a larger archaeological context which cannot legally be disturbed"
and furthermore "ample regulations within each individual agency cover items, such as
arrowheads, which may appear to have been declared fair game by the passage of ARPA")
(footnote omitted).
9. Public lands are those which are administered or owned by the United States as
part of the national forest system, the national wildlife refuge system, or the national park
system and all lands which the United States holds in fee title (except lands under the
jurisdiction of the Smithsonian Institution and lands on the Outer Continental Shelf). 16
U.S.C. § 470bb(3). Indian lands are those of Indian individuals or tribes which either are
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States or which are held in
trust by the United States. Id. § 470bb(4).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b). See also 16 U.S.C. §§ 470bb(2), 470dd. ARPA provides that
any 'archaeological resources which are excavated or removed from public lands.., remain
the property of the United States[.]" 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(3). To the extent that non-
archaeological resources are involved, ARPA does not convey any property rights to one
who discovers these resources, and if embedded in the soil of public lands, such resources
belong to the United States under a well-recognized exception to the common law of finds.
See United States v. Shivers, 96 F.3d 120, 122-24 (5th Cir. 1996). The impetus for ARPA
stemmed from the recognition by Congress that the existing federal law (which included
the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the National Historic Preservation Act) did not provide
adequate protection to prevent the destruction and loss of sites and archaeological re-
sources on public and Indian lands from the pillage and uncontrolled excavations of these
resources and sites. 16 U.S.C. § 480aa(a)(1)-(3). See Uri A. Jurist, Comment, Wild Burros,
Fences, and ARPA: Viewing the Archaeological Resources Protection Act as Property Clause
Legislation, 5 PA. J. CONST. L. 109 (2002) (noting that "[tihe Archaeological Resources Pro-
tection Act ... was created to cure 'deficiencies' of the Antiquities Act of 1906"); Ades, su-
pra, note 3, at 606 n.63 ("[tihe inherent deficiencies of the Antiquities Act and the failure of
the subsequent federal preservation laws to address the problem of archaeological looting
dictated the need for new archaeological resource protection legislation").
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partments of the Interior, Defense, and Agriculture and the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority to issue uniform regulations which were
subsequently adopted in 1984.11 Federal land managers also have
the authority to promulgate regulations and rules consistent with
the governing uniform regulations and which are necessary to per-
form their responsibilities under the Act.
Upon conviction, ARPA subjects a criminal defendant to a pos-
sible criminal fine, imprisonment, and an order of restitution,3 as
well as forfeiture of the archaeological resources, equipment and
vehicles connected to the violation. 4 Four types of conduct are
11. 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(a); see 43 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-7.37 (2002) (Department of the Interior);
36 C.F.R. §§ 296.1-296.21 (2002) (Department of Agriculture); 32 C.F.R. §§ 229.1-229.21
(2002) (Department of Defense); 18 C.F.R. §§ 1312.1-1312.21 (2003) (TenneEsee Valley
Authority). See Sherry Hutt, The Civil Prosecution Process of the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act, Technical Brief 16 available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/PUBS/TECHBR/
tchl6a.htm (noting that "[a]lthough ARPA became law on October 31, 1979, the Uniform
Regulations were not adopted until January 6, 1984").
12. 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(b). The "Federal land manager," in the case of public lands, is
"the Secretary of the department, or the head of any other agency or instrumentality of the
United States, having primary management authority over such lands." Id. § 470bb(2).
When no agency, instrumentality or department has primary management authority over
public or Indian lands, then the federal land manager is the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
Also, with the Secretary of the Interior's consent, the heads of any instrumentalities or
agencies or Secretaries of other departments may delegate their responsibilities under the
Act (in whole or in part) to the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
13. A federal court has no "inherent power to order restitution." United States v.
Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 1997). Authority for such an order is derived from stat-
ute. United States v. Gottesman, 122 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1997). ARPA's criminal provi-
sions do not explicitly provide for restitution; they mention cost of restoration and repair in
the context of one of the values to be considered in assessing the amount of damage to the
resource which will determine whether the conduct involves a misdemeanor or a felony
offense. See 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d). The Victim and Witness Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §§
3663, 3664) grants a district court discretion to order restitution in the case of certain speci-
fied offenses. While offenses under ARPA are not specifically identified under that act, it
grants a district court discretion to "order restitution in any criminal case to the extent
agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Thus, in the case of a plea involving only an ARPA violation, a court may order restitution
to the extent that it is agreed to by the parties. If, following a trial, a defendant is con-
victed of an ARPA violation and a Title 18 offense (not subject to mandatory restitution
under the Mandatory Restitution Act), restitution is discretionary. See 18 U.S.C. §
3663(a)(1)(A). Title 18 offenses involving property are subject to mandatory restitution
under the Mandatory Restitution Act (18 U.S.C. § 3663A). An illustration of mandatory
restitution, in the context of a defendant who was convicted of conspiring to violate ARPA
under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and also violating ARPA is found at United States v. Quarrell, 310
F.3d 664, 676-78 (10th Cir. 2002). This case is discussed infra Part III.D.
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(d), 470gg(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3663; see Sherry Hutt, Elwood W. Jones
& Martin E. McAllister, Archaeological Resource Protection (Preservation Press 1992), at 43
("Upon conviction in a criminal case a defendant may be incarcerated, fined, required to
pay restitution, or any combination of the three.").
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proscribed under the Act. 5 First, the Act prohibits the excava-
tion, removal, damage, alteration or attempt to do the same --
without a permit" -- of any archaeological resources located on
Indian or public lands. 7 Addressing trafficking," the Act next
prohibits the sale, purchase, exchange, transportation or receipt
(or the offer to do the same), of any archaeological resource which
was excavated or removed from Indian or public lands without a
permit or otherwise in violation of federal law.'9 ARPA also pro-
hibits the sale, purchase, exchange, transportation, receipt (or of-
fer to do the same), in foreign or interstate commerce, of any ar-
chaeological resource which was removed, excavated, exchanged,
sold, purchased, received or transported in violation of State or
local law.2° Lastly, counseling, soliciting, or employing any person
to violate any of the aforementioned prohibitions is also a violation
under the Act.2
15. These prohibitions apply to conduct occurring after October 30, 1979. 16 U.S.C. §
470ee(e).
16. The types of permits and the nature of the exemption to the permit requirement in
the case of an Indian tribe or member when the archaeological site is located on Indian
lands are discussed in 16 U.S.C. § 470cc. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 7.5-7.12; 36 C.F.R. §§ 296.5-
296.12; 32 C.F.R. §§ 229.5-229.12; 18 C.F.R. §§ 1312.5-1312.12; David G. Bercaw, Com-
ment, Requiem for Indiana Jones: Federal Law, Native Americans, and the Treasure Hunt-
ers, 30 TULSA L. J. 213, 220 (1994) (discussing permit system). See also Bonnichsen v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1165-66 (D. Or. 2002) (discussing curation require-
ments for resources after removal pursuant to a duly issued permit). The denial of a permit
is subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Exhumation of Lewis,
999 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 n.8 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a).
18. See Rogers, supra note 8, at 72 (noting that "ARPA is the first federal antiquities
preservation law to focus on entrepreneurs").
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(b), (f). A museum, for example, "could become liable under the
[Aict for receiving and/or purchasing historical objects taken from public or Indian lands."
Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEW. ENG. L.
REV. 63, 75 (1993); see Lorrie D. Northey, The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979: Protecting Prehistory for the Future, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 80 (1982) ("Muse-
ums, universities, and other institutions, which are subject to ARPA's prohibitions, must
now take care to determine the origin of their acquisitions.") (footnote omitted). See also
Hutt, Jones & McAllister, supra note 14, at 35 (noting that "exchange of an item does not
require that money change hands").
20. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c); see Jurist, supra note 10, at 120 (noting that this section "ex-
tends ARPA protection to archaeological resources that are not derived from public or In-
dian lands once these objects are obtained in violation of any state or local law and are
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.") (footnote omitted); Northey, supra note 19
at 80 ("Violators of state or local law are now subject to stiff federal criminal penalties
when they traffic in illegally obtained artifacts and are more likely to be prosecuted be-
cause enforcement does not depend entirely on the efforts of state and local governments
with limited jurisdictions and inadequate enforcement resources.") (footnote omitted).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d); see Hutt, Jones & McAllister, supra note 14, at 42 (recognizing
that "[t]he fourth ARPA prohibition category is aimed at those who hire others who then
have direct contact with the illegally acquired archaeological material").
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For criminal liability to attach, any of these offenses must be
undertaken "knowingly."22 The maximum penalty under ARPA, in
the case of a first violation is a $10,000 fine and one years' impris-
onment unless the commercial or archaeological value of the ar-
chaeological resource involved and the cost of repair and restora-
tion exceeds $500, in which case the maximum penalty is a
$20,000 fine and two years' imprisonment.2" The maximum pen-
alty for a second offense is a $100,000 fine and five years' impris-
onment.24  Under the Criminal Fines and Improvement Act of
1987, the maximum fines were increased to $100,000 and
$250,000 in the case of an individual, and $200,000 and $500,000
in the case of a corporation, for (certain) misdemeanor and felony
22. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d); see Hutt, Jones & McAllister, supra note 14, at 43 ("A viola-
tion of ARPA is a general intent crime .... A general intent offense only requires the gov-
ernment to show that the persons were acting of their own free will, but not that they knew
in their minds that it was wrong to proceed."). But see pages 232-235, infra.
23. Id. § 470ee(d). In 1988, the amount necessary to trigger a felony violation was
decreased from $5,000 to $500. See P.L. 100-588 (Sec.(b)), 102 Stat. 2983 (1988). See also
Northey, supra note 19, at 83 (noting that in ascertaining whether the violation reaches the
felony threshold, the three elements of value to consider are '(1) commercial or archaeologi-
cal value, (2) cost of restoration, and (3) cost of repair.") (footnotes omitted). See generally
Sherry Hutt, Illegal Trafficking in Native American Human Remains and Cultural Items: A
New Protection Tool, 24 ARIz. ST. L. J. 135, 141 (1992) ("It was only subsequent to Novem-
ber 1998, when the jurisdictional limit for a felony was reduced from $5,000 to $500 in
damages, that ARPA became a widely used law."). The Department of the Interior regula-
tions (which are identical to those issued by the Departments of Agriculture and Defense
and the Tennessee Valley Authority) define archaeological value, commercial value and
cost of repair as follows:
(a) Archaeological Value... [T]he archaeological value of any archaeological resource
involved in a violation of the prohibitions in Section 7.4 ... shall be the value of the
information associated with the archaeological resource. This value shall be ap-
praised in terms of the costs of the retrieval of the scientific information which would
have been obtainable prior to the violation. These costs may include, but need not be
limited to, the cost of preparing a research design, conducting field work, carrying out
laboratory analysis, and preparing reports as would be necessary to realize the in-
formation potential ....
(b) Commercial value . .. [T]he commercial value of any archaeological resource in-
volved in a violation of the prohibitions of Section 7.4 . . . shall be its fair market
value. Where the violation has resulted in damage to the archaeological resource, the
fair market value should be determined using the condition of the archaeological re-
source prior to the violation, to the extent that its prior condition can be ascertained.
(c) Cost of restoration and repair ... [Tihe cost of restoration and repair of archaeo-
logical resources damaged as a result of a violation of prohibitions or conditions...
shall be the sum of the costs already incurred for emergency and restoration or repair
work, plus those costs projected to be necessary to complete restoration and repair.
43 C.F.R. § 7.14(a)-(c). See 36 C.F.R. § 296.14; 32 C.F.R. § 229.14; 18 C.F.R. § 1312.14. See
also Hutt, Jones & McAllister, supra note 19, at 65-68 (discussing methodology to arrive at
each of these values).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d). Restitution may also be ordered under certain circumstances.
See supra footnote 13.
offenses, respectively.25 All archaeological resources connected to
any of the three criminally proscribed acts under ARPA, and all
equipment and vehicles used in connection with any of those viola-
tions are, upon conviction, subject to forfeiture to the United
States.26
ARPA also provides for the imposition of civil penalties by the
federal land manager for violations of the governing regulations or
any condition or term in a duly issued permit.27 The administra-
tive mechanics of the civil penalty provisions are straightforward.
Prior to the imposition of a penalty, the putative violator must be
served with a notice of violation advising him of the specific na-
ture of the infraction, the facts surrounding it, the amount of the
proposed penalty (if one has been ascertained by the time the no-
tice is served), and the right to respond in writing to the notice by
filing a petition for relief.2" The putative violator must further be
informed that he has the right to await receipt of a notice of as-
sessment, request a hearing in connection with such notice, and
seek judicial review of any administrative decision imposing a civil
penalty. He then has 45 days to respond to the notice of violation
(or proposed penalty, if served later), during which time he may
enter into informal discussions with the land manager, file a peti-
tion for relief, take no action and await a notice of assessment, or
accept the proposed penalty."
Upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for relief, the
completion of review of any petition filed, or the conclusion of the
informal discussions, whichever takes place later, if the federal
land manager determines that a violation occurred, he must notify
the putative violator in writing of the amount assessed explaining
25. P.L. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3571).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 470gg(b)(1).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 470ffa). The regulations incorporate the provisions found in sections
470ee(a) and (b) of ARPA. 18 C.F.R. § 7.15(a); 32 C.F.R. § 229.15(a); 36 C.F.R. § 296.15(a);
43 C.F.R. § 7.15(a). On the question of what impact, if any, the provision of these civil
penalties have on the ability of federal land managers to initiate civil actions, one commen-
tator has noted that "[tihe Act's legislative history suggests.., that Congress was aware
that federal land managers had authority to initiate civil actions to recover damages, and
did not intend to restrict this or any other available remedy." Northey, supra note 19, at 87
n.182.
28. 18 C.F.R. § 296.15(b)(1)-(4); 32 C.F.R. § 229.15(b)(1)-(4); 36 C.F.R. § 296.15(b)(1)-(4);
43 C.F.R. § 7.15(b)(1)-(4); see 16 U.S.C. § 470ff(a)(1) ("No penalty may be assessed under
this subsection unless such a person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing with
respect to such violation.")
29. Id.
30. 18 C.F.R. § 296.15(c)(1)-(4); 32 C.F.R. § 229.15(c)(1)-(4); 36 C.F.R. § 296.15(c)(1)-(4);
43 C.F.R. § 7.15(c)(1)-(4).
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how that figure was reached." The putative violator served with a
notice of assessment may request a hearing within 45 days of ser-
vice of the notice of assessment.32 The decision resulting from this
hearing or any further applicable administrative appeal consti-
tutes the final agency decision, which may be appealed to a United
States District Court." If the putative violator does not appeal
and does not pay the assessed civil penalty within 45 days of the
final administrative decision, the federal land manager may re-
quest the Attorney General to institute a civil action to collect the
penalty, or initiate an action directly. 4 In either case, neither the
amount nor the validity of the penalty assessed is subject to judi-
cial review.35
In general, in the case of a first violation, the maximum amount
of the penalty is limited to the cost restoration and repair plus the
commercial or archaeological value of archaeological resources not
recovered or destroyed.36 In the case of a second violation, those
amounts are doubled.37 When assessing a penalty, the federal
land manager may determine to impose an amount less than the
maximum, or may offer to remit or mitigate a penalty based on a
number of factors including the aggrieved party's agreement to
return the archaeological resource(s), hardship, and whether the
31. 18 C.F.R. § 296.15(e)(4), (f); 32 C.F.R. § 229.15(e)(4), (f); 36 C.F.R. § 296.15(e)(4), (f);
43 C.F.R. § 7.15(e)(4), (f). The notice of assessment must also advise the person served of
the right to an administrative hearing and the right to judicial review of any final adminis-
trative ruling which imposes a civil penalty. 18 C.F.R. § 296.15(f)(3); 32 C.F.R. §
229.15(f)(3); 36 C.F.R. § 296.15(f)(3); 43 C.F.R. § 7.15(f)(3).
32. 18 C.F.R. § 296.16(g)(1)-(2); 32 C.F.R. § 229.16(g)(1)-(2); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(g)(1)-(2);
43 C.F.R. § 7.16(g)(1)-(2). At this hearing, the amount of the assessment may be increased
or decreased by the administrative law judge. 18 C.F.R. § 296.15(g)(3); 32 C.F.R. §
229.15(g)(3); 36 C.F.R. § 296.15(g)(3); 43 C.F.R. § 7.15(g)(3).
33. 18 C.F.R. § 296.16(h)(3), (i); 32 C.F.R. § 229.16(h)(3), (i); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(h)(3), (i);
43 C.F.R. § 7.16(h)(3), (i); see 16 U.S.C. § 470ff(b)(1).
34. 18 C.F.R. § 296.16(i)(1)-(2); 32 C.F.R. § 229.16(i)(1)-(2); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(i)(1)-(2);
43 C.F.R. § 7.16(i)(1)-(2); see 16 U.S.C. § 470ff(b)(2).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 470f(b).
36. 18 C.F.R. § 296.16(a)(1); 32 C.F.R. § 229.16(a)(1); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(a)(1); 43 C.F.R.
§ 7.16(a)(1); see 16 U.S.C. § 470ia)(2). As to the reference in section 470ff(a)(2) that in
assessing the amount of the penalty the regulations should take into account, among "other
factors," the commercial or archaeological value of the archaeological resource involved, as
well as the cost of repair and restoration of the resource, one commentator has noted that
given the Congressional intent to limit the amount of the civil penalty by the commercial or
archaeological value of the resource and the cost of repair or restoration, "other factors'
may refer to mitigating factors." Northey, supra note 19, at 86 n.168.
37. 18 C.F.R. § 296.16(a)(2); 32 C.F.R. § 229.16(a)(2); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(a)(2); 43 C.F.R.
§ 7.16(a)(2). No penalty imposed under section 470ff(a)(2) may "exceed an amount equal to
double the cost of restoration and repair of resources and archaeological sites damaged and
double the fair market value of resources destroyed or not recovered." 16 U.S.C. §
470ff(a)(2).
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person willfully committed the violation.8 Lastly, as with crimi-
nal sanctions, the forfeiture provisions may be triggered if a civil
penalty is assessed or there is "a determination by any court that
such archaeological resources, vehicles, or equipment were in-
volved in such violation."
39
III. EVOLVING CASE LAW RELATING TO CRIMINAL PENALTY
PROVISIONS
In recent years, ARPA's criminal penalty provisions have come
under judicial scrutiny. The principal challenges have centered
on whether the statute is constitutionally overbroad and vague,
the application of the mens rea requirement, and whether the
prohibition against interstate or foreign commerce involving ar-
chaeological resources is limited to objects removed from federal or
Indian lands. Cases addressing these issues, as well as the appli-
38. 18 C.F.R. § 296.16(b); 32 C.F.R. § 229.16(b); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(b); 43 C.F.R. §
7.16(b). Specifically, the regulations provide:
(1) Determination of the penalty amount and/or a proposal to mitigate or remit the
penalty may be based upon any of the following factors:
(i) Agreement by the person being assessed a civil penalty to return to the Fed-
eral Land manager archaeological resources removed from public lands or In-
dian lands;
(ii) Agreement by the person being assessed a civil penalty to assist the Federal
land manager in activity to preserve, restore, or otherwise contribute to the
protection and study of archaeological resources on public lands or Indian
lands;
(iii) Agreement by the person being assessed a civil penalty to provide informa-
tion which will assist in the detection, prevention, or prosecution of violations
of the Act or this part;
(iv) Demonstration of hardship or inability to pay, provided that this factor
shall only be considered when the person being assessed a civil penalty has not
been found to have previously violated the regulation in this part;
(v) Determination that the person being assessed a civil penalty did not will-
fully commit the violation;
(vi) Determination that the proposed penalty would constitute excessive pun-
ishment under the circumstances;
(vii) Determination of other mitigating circumstances appropriate to considera-
tion in reaching a fair and expeditious assessment.
Id. When the violation occurs on Indian lands or affects Indian tribal cultural or religious
sites, the federal land manager must confer with the appropriate Indian tribe(s) prior to
any remission or mitigation of a penalty. 18 C.F.R. § 296.16(b)(2)-(3); 32 C.F.R. §
229.16(b)(2)-(3); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(b)(2)-(3); 43 C.F.R. § 7.16(b)(2)-(3).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 470gg(b)(3); see Rogers, supra note 8, at 79 (noting that "[tihis last
determination may be made by an administrative law judge at the agency level, and is a
powerful plea-bargaining tool for the prosecution.") (footnote omitted); Hutt, supra note 11
(noting that administrative law judge "may order that archaeological resources in the pos-
session of the person and all vehicles and equipment which were used in the violation be
forfeited") (footnote omitted).
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cation of the Sentencing Guidelines and restitution in an ARPA-
related prosecution, are analyzed below.
A. Overbreadth and Vagueness
Not surprisingly, the first major challenge to ARPA's criminal
penalty provisions came in the form of a constitutional attack on
the language of the statute.40 Specifically, in United States v. Aus-
tin,4 following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of violating
section 470ee(a) of ARPA for excavating archaeological resources
(in particular scrapers and arrow points) in an archaeological site
without a permit.42  Maintaining, under the First Amendment,
that "curiosity motivated him, [that] his activity was academic,
and that academic freedom" protected his conduct, defendant ap-
pealed his conviction on the grounds that the statute was uncon-
stitutionally overbroad and vague.43 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments.
First, the court ruled that in order to prevail on a claim of over-
breadth involving conduct and not merely speech, Austin was re-
quired to contend that ARPA "ambiguously reache[d] protected
activities and that the overbreadth [wa]s substantial," and he did
neither. Insofar as the vagueness challenge was concerned, the
court noted that a statute that did not implicate constitutionally
protected conduct should not be invalidated unless it was imper-
missibly vague in all applications.45 In Austin's case, although
defendant argued that the terms "weapons" and "tools" found in
the definition of archaeological resource were inherently and
impermissibly vague," as to him, "there c[ould] be no doubt nor
40. A similar attack had nullified the criminal penalty provisions of the Antiquities Act.
In United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974), the court had ruled that 16 U.S.C. §
433, which imposed criminal sanctions for taking "objects of antiquity," was unconstitu-
tionally vague since those terms did not provide adequate notice of what objects were pro-
tected under the statute. Id. at 114-15.
41. 902 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990).
42. Id. at 744-45. The investigation which led to the charges resulted in the seizure of
excavation tools, documents, photographs and approximately 2,800 Native American arti-
facts. Id. at 743.
43. Id. at 744-45.
44. Id. As the court explained, "[niot only d[id] [defendant] not claim that the First
Amendment actually protects any activity that ARPA reaches, he d[id] not even suggest its
relevance to any activity except his own excavating." Id. at 745.
45. Id.
46. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(a)(1); see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) ("[Tlhe
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.").
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lack of fair notice that the scrapers and arrow points for which he
was convicted [we]re indeed weapons and tools;" consequently, his
vagueness challenge failed.47 ARPA's ability to withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny has been hailed as a "great success for the Act."4"
B. Mens Rea
As noted previously, for criminal liability to attach under any of
ARPA's prohibitions, there must be a finding that the defendant
acted "knowingly." 9 But knowingly as to what? With respect to
prosecutions under section 470ee(a), one court has ruled that the
government must prove that a defendant knew that what he re-
moved, damaged, excavated or otherwise defaced was an "archaeo-
logical resource," while another held that the government need not
prove that he also knew that the prohibited conduct he engaged in
occurred "on public lands." In arriving at these rulings, the
courts have applied the teaching of two United States Supreme
Court cases addressing the mens rea requirement in other crimi-
nal statutes. Each of these cases is briefly discussed below.
First, in Staples v. United States," the Supreme Court ruled
that in order to convict a defendant of possession of an unregis-
tered firearm under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)," the government needed
to prove that defendant knew that the weapon he possessed had
the specific characteristics that brought it within the statutory
definition of the National Firearms Act. 2 In that case, the Court
concluded that dispensing with a mens rea requirement would
"criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct."5 3 This
was so since "guns generally can be owned in perfect innocence"
47. Austin, 902 F.2d at 745.
48. Sheveland, supra note 3, at 39 ("The fact that ARPA withstood constitutional scru-
tiny in the Ninth Circuit was a great success for the Act.") See also Jurist, supra note 10,
at 120 (by explicitly defining "public lands," "Indian lands," and archaeological resources"
ARPA's drafters "endeavored[d] to ensure that the same void-for-vagueness fate of the
Antiquities Act did not befall ARPA.") (footnote omitted).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d).
50. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
51. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) states in relevant part that it is "unlawful for any person ... to
receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Regis-
tration and Transfer Record[.]"
52. Staples, 511 U.S. at 619.
53. Id. at 610 (internal quotations omitted).
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and "there [wa]s a long tradition of widespread lawful gun owner-
ship by private individuals in this country."54
The second case relied on by the lower courts is United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc.,55 where the Supreme Court interpreted
section 2252(a) of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation Act. 56 Section 2252(a) of that act prohibited the know-
ing transportation, shipment, receipt, or distribution of any visual
depiction if such "visual depiction involve[d] the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and the Court ruled that to
sustain a conviction under this section, the government needed to
prove that the defendant must have known that one of the per-
formers was a minor." The Court was concerned that dispensing
with the mens rea requirement would criminalize "otherwise inno-
cent conduct,"" and citing the First Amendment, stated that "the
age of the performers [wa]s the crucial element separating legal
innocence from wrongful conduct."59 We now turn to the cases dis-
cussing mens rea under ARPA.
1. Archaeological Resources
In United States v. Lynch,"° defendant was convicted of a felony
under section 470ee(a) of ARPA following a conditional plea.5 The
facts in the case were not in dispute. In the summer of 1997,
Lynch (a 23-year-old high school graduate) and two friends went
deer hunting on Heceta Island, an uninhabited island in southeast
Alaska. 2 While his friends were packing up camp, Lynch went
looking for caves and as he was walking over some boulders, he
noticed what appeared to be the back of a skull.63 Lynch picked up
54. Id. at 610-11. The Court also recognized that the potentially harsh penalty under
section 5861(d) - up to 10 years' imprisonment - served as "a further factor tending to
suggest that Congress did not intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement." Id. at 618-19.
55. 513 U.S. 62 (1994).
56. Id. at 65-66.
57. Id. at 78.
58. Id. at 72.
59. Id. at 73.
60. 233 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000).
61. Id. Section 470ee(a) prohibits the excavation, removal, damage, alteration or at-
tempt to do the same, without a permit, of any archaeological resources located on Indian
or public lands. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a).
62. Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1140. A report prepared for the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act indicated that the remains of an Alaska native village were located on that is-
land. Id. There was no evidence that Lynch was aware of that report. Id.
63. Id.
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the object and recognized it as a skull.64 He then cleared away
some rocks and dirt and discovered other bones. 5 After putting
these other bones back in place, Lynch took the skull home with
him "to do some research on it."6
Lynch's discovery came to the attention of U.S. Forest Service
agents who interviewed him." Lynch gave the skull to the agents
and directed them to the location of the other bones." After the
regional Forest Service's archaeologist and a physical anthro-
polologist were unable to ascertain the age of the skull by oste-
ological examination, a fragment was cut and subjected to carbon
dating.69 The analysis indicated that the skull was at least 1400
years old and Lynch thereafter was charged and convicted of a
felony violation under section 470ee(a) .
On appeal, Lynch argued that his conviction could not stand be-
cause the government had not established that he knew or had
reason to know that what he removed was an "archaeological re-
source."71  The United Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
agreed, vacating the conviction and allowing Lynch to withdraw
his plea.72
After reviewing the legislative history and the concern ex-
pressed there over prosecution "of the casual visitor who happens
to find some exposed artifact,"73 the court pointed out that in most
cases, the knowing requirement necessary to trigger a violation
meant that a defendant "must 'know the facts that make his con-
duct illegal.' 74  In the circumstances involving Lynch, and relying
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
67. Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1140. During the interview, Lynch acknowledged that the skull
"definitely had been there for a while." Id. (internal quotation omitted). He further stated:





71. Id. at 1140-41.
72. Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1145-46.
73. Id. at 1142 (internal quotation omitted); id. at 1144 ("comments [of bill's sponsor
and others] acknowledge the possibility that boy scouts and other 'casual visitors' might
innocently and inadvertently remove an artifact from the public domain."); id. at 1145
("With respect to . . .ARPA . . .the legislative history suggests that Congress was con-
cerned about the risk of penalizing arch[a]ecologically naive visitors to public lands.").
74. Id. at 1143 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 606). Thus, for example, in Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the Court ruled that under 18 U.S.C. § 641, which
criminalized the knowing conversion of "a thing of value of the United States," the govern-
Winter 2004 ARPA 233
Duquesne Law Review
on Staples, the court reasoned that there was the very real poten-
tial for the imposition of a harsh penalty on an unwitting violator
since "a skull may or may not be an archaeological resource, just
as it may, or may not be evidence of a recent accident or of a re-
cent crime."75 Thus, while Lynch "may or may not have been a
wholly innocent casual visitor,"76 the danger of convicting an un-
witting person of a felony was present in his case since "nobody
knew until after a lengthy investigation that the object taken was
more than 100 years old, and that the costs associated with resto-
ration of the site would exceed $500.""7 Recognizing by analogy
the widespread tradition of gun ownership identified in Staples,
the court noted that Lynch's prosecution had to be considered in
the context of a "widespread tradition of arrowhead and artifact
collecting."78
Further, and echoing the concerns of X-Citement Video that
there should be a presumption that scienter must be proven as to
each element in a statute that criminalizes otherwise innocent
conduct, the court noted that "[b]ecause removing objects that are
not 'archaeological resources' from public land is not a violation of
ARPA, the knowingly requirement should apply to the term 'ar-
chaeological resources' as well as the prohibited act of removing. " "
In light of these circumstances, the court ruled that in order to
sustain a conviction under section 470ee(a), the government
needed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew or had reason to know that he was removing an "archaeo-
logical resource.""°
ment had to establish that defendant knew that the property he converted belonged to the
United States. Id. at 271.
75. Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1143.
76. Id. In this regard, the court observed that Lynch admitted he was "at least curious
about, artifacts associated with early inhabitants of the land. He admitted that he was
hoping to find something in his cave wonderings, and that he liked to collect things. He
even admitted to agents that he knew he had done something wrong." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court rejected the government's characterization of Lynch's conduct as
falling within the purview of grave robbing since there was nothing in the record to suggest
that Lynch knew or should have known that the skull was located in a grave and he had
not been charged with robbing a grave. Id. at 1143-44.
79. Id. at 1144.
80. Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1145-46. The court in Lynch made no reference to its prior
ruling in United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1999). In Tidwell, defendant was
convicted of conspiracy, illegal trafficking in Native American items under the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), theft of tribal property, and
trafficking in archaeological resources under ARPA. Id. The ARPA count related to a set of
priest robes from the Acoma Pueblo which defendant purchased from an undercover agent.
Id. at 979.
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2. Public Lands /Mistake of Fact Defense
Whether the government must also establish beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant knew that the prohibited conduct
engaged in under section 470ee(a) occurred on public or Indian
lands also has been the source of judicial review."1 In United
States v. Quarrell,82 defendants were convicted of violating section
470ee(a) and conspiring to violate ARPA pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
371 for vandalizing an archaeological site in the Gila National
Forest in southern New Mexico.83 On appeal, they argued that
their convictions should be vacated because the government had
failed to prove that they knew they were on public lands at the
time of the prohibited conduct.'
The court rejected this contention, finding that the extension of
the "mens rea requirement to the 'located on public lands element'
would frustrate the purpose of the Act."" The court reasoned that
unless the government posted signs at or near an archaeological
site, it would be difficult to establish that a defendant knew he
was on public lands; yet placing signs near the sites would have
the adverse effect of drawing the attention of potential looters. 6
The court also distinguished Staples and X-Citement Video be-
cause "[u]nlike a citizen owning a firearm unaware of its auto-
In sustaining defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in connection
with his conviction under section 470ee(b), the court noted that to convict a defendant of a
violation under that section the government had to prove that he "(1) purchased or sold, (2)
an archaeological resource, (3) that was removed from Indian lands, (4) without a permit."
Id. at 981-82. In that regard, the expert testimony presented by the government and other
evidence that the robes were owned by the Acoma Pueblo were sufficient to uphold the
conviction. Id. at 981-82. The defendant in Tidwell did not argue that the government had
to prove that he knew or had reason to know that the artifacts he was trafficking in were
archaeological resources and the court noted that (in relation to his conviction under
NAGPRA) witnesses had told defendant that they were prohibited from selling the robes.
Id. at 981.
81. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(b) similarly makes reference to both public and Indian lands.
82. 310 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 2002).
83. Id. at 668. Defendants were apprehended while excavating a Mimbres-Mogollon
ruin. Id. at 669. At the time of their arrest, they had in their possession backpacks, sleep-
ing bags, shovels, a gun, an instrument used to gauge the alignment of rock walls, and
pieces of Mimbre pottery. Id. They "stipulated that they were familiar with Mimbres ar-
chaeology and art; they knew they were digging in a prehistoric Mimbres Pueblo; they
intended to excavate and remove Mimbres artifacts; and they had not received or applied
for a permit from the Forest Service to excavate the site." Id.
84. Id. at 669.
85. Id. at 671.
86. Id. In this regard, the court observed that land managers had been authorized by
Congress to conceal the location and nature of any archaeological resource unless the dis-
closure of such resource "would 'not create a risk of harm to such resources or to the site at
which such resources [we]re located.'" Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 470hh(a)(2)).
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matic firing capabilities, or a distributor of sexually-explicit mate-
rials unaware of the age of its performers, a person excavating on
someone else's land, whether public or private, c[ould] not rea-
sonably expect to be free from regulation."8" And contrasting the
casual visitor intended to be protected by Lynch's ruling, the court
found that defendants "knew they were excavating and knew they
were removing valuable archaeological resources from the land"
and that "precisely [wals the activity Congress intended to prevent
and punish when it enacted ARPA."5
In conclusion, the court ruled that the location of defendants'
potentially illegal conduct was a jurisdictional element of the of-
fense. 9 As a defense to a prosecution under section 470ee(a), how-
ever, the court recognized that a defendant could present a mis-
take of fact defense by adducing evidence that "honestly and con-
scientiously," he held a "reasonable belief that he was excavating
on private land with permission.""
C. Trafficking in Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Sections 470ee(a) and (b) of ARPA proscribe the unauthorized
excavation, removal, damage, alteration or defacement of archaeo-
logical resources or the trafficking in any such resources located
on public or Indian lands.91 Section 470ee(c), however, prohibits
the trafficking in interstate or foreign commerce of archaeological
resources, the excavation, sale, removal purchase, transportation,
exchange, or receipt of which was "in violation of any provision,
rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect under State or local
law."92 Given the numerous references in ARPA to federal and
87. Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 672. The court observed that unlike the "long tradition of gun
ownership" recognized in Staples, there was no similar tradition associated with excavation
of archaeological resources - without permission - in private or public land and that such
conduct was not "viewed as an innocent act." Id.
88. Id. at 673. As the court explained:
Requiring a defendant to know the object he is removing is an archaeological re-
sources protects against convicting the casual visitor, like a Boy Scout, who picks up
an object unaware that it is a prehistoric artifact. It is unclear, however, how requir-
ing a defendant to know the status of the land he is excavating will further Congress'
desire to avoid punishing the casual visitor or prevent punishing otherwise innocent
conduct.
Id.
89. Id. at 674; see United States v. Speir, 564 F.2d 934, 938 (10th Cir. 1977) (require-
ment under 18 U.S.C. § 641 that the stolen property be property of the United States "fur-
nishes the jurisdictional basis for the federal offense").
90. Id. at 675 (internal quotation omitted; emphasis in original).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a), (b).
92. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c).
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Indian lands at least two questions are presented under section
470ee(c) - first, despite the references in this section to state and
local law, is the Act applicable only to federal and/or Indian lands?
Second, assuming the Act extends beyond federal and/or Indian
lands, do the violations of state or local laws have to pertain to
laws which concern archaeological sites or objects, or can they be
laws of general application such as those prohibiting theft and
trespass? These questions were squarely confronted by the case to
which we now turn.
In United States v. Gerber,93 defendant, a well-known collector of
Indian artifacts, was convicted of transporting in interstate com-
merce artifacts he had stolen from a burial mound located on pri-
vately owned land in violation of Indiana's conversion and tres-
pass laws.94 On appeal, he argued that the preamble to the Act
and its legislative history demonstrated that the omission to fed-
eral and Indian lands in section 470ee(c) was inadvertent; there-
fore, that section needed to be construed as being limited to sites
and objects on Indian and federal lands.95 In the alternative, de-
fendant maintained that to the extent violations of state or local
law triggered section 470ee(c)'s applicability, those state or local
laws needed to be "explicitly concerned with the protection of ar-
chaeological sites or objects."96
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
jected both contentions. With respect to the former, the court de-
termined that the reference in section 470ee(c) to interstate com-
merce "would be superfluous if the subsection were limited to arti-
facts taken from federal or Indian lands, since either source would
establish federal jurisdiction with no need to require proof that
the artifacts were transported in interstate commerce."97 As to
the latter, the court agreed that the "Act [wa]s limited to cases in
which the violation of state law [wa]s related to the protection of
archaeological sites or objects" but also found that "to be deemed
related to the protection of archaeological resources a state or local
93. 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994).
94. Id. at 1113.
95. Id. at 1115.
96. Id. at 1116 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 1115. As to the argument presented in an amicus brief by a number of ama-
teur archaeologist associations that such an interpretation would infringe on their ability to
enhance their archaeological knowledge by excavating private lands, the court tersely noted
that there "[wa]s no right to go upon another person's land, without his permission, to look
for valuable objects buried in the land and take them if [one] find[s] them." Id. at 1115-16.
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law ... [need not] be limited to that protection."98 Gerber's ruling
is significant in that it judicially confirmed that "ARPA can be
used to protect archaeological resources located on private land if
they [w]ere obtained illegally and moved across state lines."99
D. The Sentencing Guidelines, Restitution and ARPA
The calculation of loss and/or damage to an archaeological re-
source is an important element of an ARPA prosecution in the
event of a conviction both for purposes of the offense level and for
determining the amount of restitution. In the past decade, there
have been only two reported cases which have addressed the
amount of "loss" for sentencing purposes under the Sentencing
Guidelines.' 0 These two cases, which were decided prior to the
promulgation of a guideline specifically addressing cultural re-
source crimes, are briefly discussed below.
In United States v. Shumway,'01 defendant was convicted of
three ARPA violations, three counts of damaging government
property, and one firearms violation.' Two of the ARPA and
damage to government property offenses related to his unauthor-
98. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1116 (emphasis in original). As the court explained in Gerber:
A law that forbade the theft of Indian artifacts 'and any other objects having histori-
cal or artistic value' could not reasonably be thought a law unrelated to the protection
of such artifacts merely because it had broader objectives. That is essentially what
Indiana's laws forbidding trespass and conversion have: objectives that include but
are not exhausted in the protection of Indian artifacts and other antiquities. A law
that comprehensively protects the owner of land from unauthorized incursions, spo-
liations, and theft could well be thought to give all the protection to buried antiqui-
ties that they need, making the passage of a law specially protecting buried antiqui-
ties redundant - and the passage of new laws is never costless and rarely easy.
Id.
99. McManamon, supra note 6, at 267 (footnote omitted); Jurist, supra note 10, at 120
(noting that "Section 470ee(c) is particularly important because it extends ARPA protection
to archaeological resources that are not derived from public or Indian lands once these
objects are obtained in violation of any state or local law and are transported in interstate
or foreign commerce.") (footnote omitted).
100. Generally speaking, under the Sentencing Guidelines, when property is taken or
destroyed, the measure of the "loss" - a critical component for sentencing purposes - is
ordinarily measured by the fair market value of the property. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1, cmt. n.2, 2B1.3(b)(1). When the property is damaged, the
loss is "the cost of repairs, not to exceed the loss had the property been destroyed [i.e., the
fair market value]." Id. The Guidelines go on to state, however, that "[w]here the market
value is difficult to ascertain or inadequate to measure harm to the victim, the court may
measure loss in some other way." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. n.2.
101. 112 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1997).
102. Id. at 1417. The charges upon which defendant was convicted stemmed from two
separate indictments. Id.
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ized excavation of two Anasazi archaeological sites. ,03 In the first,
defendant excavated the burial site of an Anasazi infant, removing
the burial blanket and leaving the infant's remains on the
ground.' 4 A damage assessment of the site undertaken subse-
quently revealed that only the skull of the infant remained "on top
of the dirt pile."'0° At the second site, defendant found and re-
moved a sleeping mat and sandals.' °0
Although the sum of the cost of restoration and repair and the
fair market value of the artifacts taken totaled $9,122, the district
court added an amount for "archaeological value" to arrive at a
loss of over $120,000. ' 0' The court justified its inclusion of ar-
chaeological value to this measure of loss under note 2 of section
2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which states that "[w]here the
market value is difficult to ascertain or inadequate to measure the
harm to the victim, the court may measure the loss in some other
way."0 s Defendant argued on appeal that this was error and that
under the Guidelines, the district court should have relied exclu-
sively on the fair market value of the artifacts taken and the cost
of repair to the sites to calculate the loss.10'9 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed.
The court of appeals determined that, given the nature of the
"detestable conduct" defendant engaged in," ° the cost of repair and
fair market value "calculation was grossly insufficient to quantify
the devastating and irremediable cultural, scientific and spiritual
damage [defendant] caused to the American people in general and
to the Native American community in particular."' In light of the
inadequacy of those traditional yardsticks to measure loss, and
the recognition in the Sentencing Guidelines themselves that
there may be instances where ordinary measures may be inade-
103. Id. The Anasazi were "a prehistoric culture living in the Four Corners area of
Utah, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico during the Formative Period from 300 A.D. to
1300 A.D." Id. at 1417 n.2.
104. Id. at 1417-18.
105. Id.
106. Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1418.
107. Id. at 1424-25. This had the effect of increasing defendant's offense level by five
levels. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E) (increasing of-
fense level by four if the loss exceed $5,000 but is less that $10,000) with § 2B1(b)(1)(j)
(increasing offense level by nine if the loss exceeds $120,000 but is less than $200,000).
108. Shumway, 112 F. 3d at 1424 (internal quotation omitted).
109. Id. at 1425.
110. Id. at 1423 n.4. The court noted that "[g]rave robbing, especially grave robbing the
sacred objects of Native Americans, [wa]s undoubtedly detestable conduct worthy of severe
castigation[.]" Id.
111. Id. at 1423.
Winter 2004 ARPA 239
Duquesne Law Review
quate, the Tenth Circuit ruled that in including archaeological
value as defined in the regulations, the district court had used a
"reasonable and objective measure specifically formulated to cal-
culate damages under the statute [defendant] was convicted of
violating to calculate loss for purposes of sentencing.""
2
The rationale employed in Shumway was not always followed by
other courts when calculating loss in an ARPA related prosecu-
tion. In United States v. Hunter,"' defendant was convicted of two
ARPA violations and one count of damaging government prop-
erty."" The ARPA violations related to prehistoric archaeological
resources from two sites and the cost of repair and restoration of
the damaged sites was estimated at $9,661.47."' In addition, the
court added $2,000 to the loss to take into account "aesthetic di-
minishment at the sites," since "[e]ven when fully restored, they
c[ould] never be put back to their pre-excavation condition."" 6 The
total loss for sentencing purposes thus totaled $11,661.47."
Relying on Shumway, the government maintained at sentencing
that in addition to the estimated cost of repair and restoration, the
loss needed to include the archaeological value of the sites, which
it estimated at $34,238.18.18 The court rejected the government's
argument. First, it noted that Shumway did not establish a firm
rule that archaeological value was always an element of loss.
Rather, Shumway merely recognized that if the ordinary meas-
ures to calculate loss were inadequate, an additional amount re-
flecting archaeological value may be used."9 In the case involving
defendant Hunter, however, the ordinary measures for loss were
sufficient.'2 ° This was because, unlike Shumway, the disparity in
the loss calculation in Hunter's case when applying and not apply-
ing archaeological value was only four and one-half times
112. Id. at 1425-26. The court also ruled that skeletal remains cannot constitute a 'vul-
nerable victim" for purposes of enhancing a defendant's sentence under Section 3A1. 1(b) of
the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1424.
113. 48 F. Supp. 2d. 1283 (D. Utah 1998).
114. Id. at 1284-85. The charges to which defendant pled and for which he was con-
victed stemmed from two separate indictments and the cases were consolidated for sentenc-
ing purposes. Id.
115. Id. at 1285, 1287. No market value was assigned by the government to the partial
spear point and five to fifteen arrowheads which defendant removed from the sites. Id. at
1287.
116. Id. at 1288.
117. Id.
118. Hunter, 48 F. Supp. at 1288. Added to the cost of repair and restoration, this figure
increased the loss to $43,895.65. Id.
119. Id. at 1290.
120. Id. at 1288.
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greater." ' Furthermore, the defendant had not removed items of
great archaeological importance or disturbed human remains.'2
But even if an adjustment for archaeological value was war-
ranted, the court determined that the estimate proffered by the
government was unreliable because it differed substantially from
the estimate in a prior report which the court had used in sentenc-
ing a co-defendant.'23 In addition, the amount estimated by the
government overstated, in the court's view, the value of defen-
dant's unlawful activities.
In Shumway and Hunter, the courts utilized the general prop-
erty sentencing guideline to determine loss. In November 2002,
however, the Sentencing Commission promulgated a new sentenc-
ing guideline tailored specifically to the protection of cultural heri-
tage resources.25  This new guideline found at section 2B1.5
"takes into account the transcendent value of these irreplaceable
resources, and punishes in a proportionate way the particular of-
fense characteristics associated with the range of cultural resource
121. Id. at 1290. When using archaeological value as an element, the amount of loss in
Hunter increased from $9,961 to $43,895; in Shumway, the amount increased from $9,122
to $137,200. Id.
122. Id. (footnote omitted).
123. Hunter, 48 F. Supp. at 1290-92.
124. Id. The court reasoned that "all [defendant] uncovered during his excavation were
some arrowheads" which the government had not lost. Id. at 1293. As to what was lost,
the court observed:
[Wihat the United States has lost is the information concerning the location of the
arrowheads to one another, their exact location at the sites when uncovered, and
whether they were recovered with or nearby other items of archaeological import.
Unfortunately, the United States' estimates regarding archaeological value do not
put a dollar value on this context. Instead, the offered archaeological value presents
a fiction. Starting with the assumption that the site was never excavated, it goes on
to estimate what it would have cost the United States to prepare a study of the site,
to excavate the site, to remove, analyze, and store any artifacts, and to prepare scien-
tific reports .... The problem with this fiction is that it does not reflect reality. The
reality is that the site was excavated, albeit unlawfully, and all that was uncovered
were some arrowheads.
Armed with the knowledge that a dig at the site would only yield arrowheads, a more
accurate calculation of archaeological value would be based on the estimated costs to
the United States to recover these artifacts.
Id.
125. A new guideline 'that would provide (1) greater guidance to judges in evaluating
the harm caused by cultural heritage resource crimes and (2) increased punishment for the
offenses" had been under consideration by the United States Sentencing Commission for
two years. See Press Release - Sentencing Commission Increases Penalties for Crimes
Against Cultural Heritage (Mar. 25, 2002) available at
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/re10302.htm.
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crimes. ""' Specifically, in addition to provisions automatically
increasing the base offense level if the offending conduct involved
an archaeological resource in the national park system or one con-
taining human remains,' the application note to the guideline
provides that archaeological value, commercial value and cost of
restoration and repair shall be included in assessing the value of
an archaeological resource."'
In connection with the promulgation of this guideline which, as
noted above, became effective in November 2002, the Chair of the
Sentencing Commission wrote to the Senate Judiciary Committee
recommending the elimination of the 24 month ceiling for first
time felony offenses under ARPA, as well as the raising of the
statutory maximum from 5 to 10 years.129 To date, no legislation
incorporating these recommendations has been enacted by Con-
gress.
A third case decided after the promulgation of the sentencing
guideline specifically tailored to the protection of cultural re-
sources but addressing restitution is United States v. Quarrell"3
As noted earlier, the defendants in Quarrell were convicted of vio-
126. Statement of Christopher Kearney, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Man-
agement and Budget, Department of the Interior, Before the Subcommittee on National
Parks, Historic Preservation, and Recreation of the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources Concerning S.2598, Enhance Protection of our Cultural Resources Act of
2002, Jul. 23, 2002, available at http://www.doi.gov/ocl/2002/s2598.htm.
127. As more generally explained by the Sentencing Commission Staff:
The guideline . . . has several specific offense characteristics that provide increases
(1) if the offense involves a place or resource that Congress has designated for special
protection; (2) if the offense that involves any number of specified resources, includ-
ing human remains and other resources that have been designated by Congress for
special treatment and heightened protection under federal law; (3) if the offense was
committed for pecuniary gain or otherwise involved a commercial purpose; (4) if the
offense involves a pattern of misconduct; and (5) if a dangerous weapon, including a
firearm, was brandished or its use threatened.
Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Effective November 1, 2002 unless
modified or rejected by Congress) - Highlights of Key Points, at 2.
128. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.5, cmt. n.2. Specifically, application
note states:
(A) General Rule - For purposes of subsection (b)(1), the value of the cultural re-
source shall include, as applicable to the particular resource involved, the following:
(i) The archaeological value. (Archaeological value shall be included in the case
of any cultural heritage resource that is an archaeological resource.)
(ii) The commercial value.
(iii) The cost of restoration and repair.
§ 2B1.5, cmt. n.2.
129. See Letter from Judge Diana E. Murphy, Chair to The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
(Chair) and the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch (Ranking Member), Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (Apr. 3, 2002) available at http'//www.ussc.gov/culheritagefleahy-hatch.htm.
130. 310 F.3d at 664.
lating § 470ee(a) and conspiring to violate ARPA pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 371 for vandalizing an archaeological site in the Gila Na-
tional Forest in southern New Mexico.' On appeal, defendants
argued that the restitution order entered against them by the dis-
trict court under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA)'32
was illegal because ARPA exclusively permitted restitution only in
the context of civil penalties.133 Additionally, they maintained
MVRA did not apply because there was no "identifiable victim,"
and an ARPA violation did not constitute an offense under Title 18
- a predicate to the applicability of MVRA. " Defendants further
argued that even if MVRA applied, the court had erred in finding
that restitution was mandatory as opposed to discretionary.'3
Lastly, defendants maintained that the amount of restitution im-
properly took into account damages for the archaeological value of
the site.'36 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected all of the arguments concerning the lack of applicabil-
ity of MVRA but agreed with defendants' contention that the
amount of restitution should not have included the archaeological
value of the site.
First, and relying on ARPA's legislative history, the court found
that the Act's failure to provide explicitly for restitution under the
criminal penalty provisions did not preclude a court from imposing
restitution under the MVRA's more general provisions.'37 In a
similar vein, neither did the Act's provision of restitution under
the civil penalty provisions preclude the imposition of restitution
131. Id. at 668.
132. The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, provides in
pertinent part that "[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law, when sentencing a
defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order, in addi-
tion to... any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to the
victim of the offense." Id. at 3663A(a)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (c) applies "in all
sentencing proceedings for convictions of, or plea agreements relating to charges for, any
offense (A) that is ... (ii) an offense against property under this title.. . and (B) in which
an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss." Id. at
3663A(c)(1).
133. Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 676.
134. Id. at 677; see supra note 13.
135. Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 677-78.
136. Id. at 678-79.
137. Id. at 677. The court cited language in the House report to the extent that in enact-
ing the criminal penalty provisions, "[the committee [wa]s aware that these penalties
overlap[ped] with more general statutes and regulations, and there [wa]s no intent to pre-
clude action under those general provisions relating to the protection of federal property
under appropriate circumstances." Id. (quoting H.R. No. 96-311, at 1714, U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1979, p. 1709 (1979)).
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in a criminal case. 3' With respect to MVRA, the court determined
that the government could be a victim under that act and while it
covered offenses arising under Title 18, and ARPA violations did
not fall under that title, defendants also had been charged with
conspiracy under Title 18, a qualifying offense.'39 Finally, as to
the argument that conspiracy was not "an offense against prop-
erty" and therefore restitution was discretionary and not manda-
tory,'4 ° the court ruled that in defendants' case, "[t]he underlying
predicate acts and purposes that constituted the conspiracy were
an offense against property." 4' And since MVRA called for man-
datory restitution if the offense against property was committed
by fraud and deceit, 142 the court reasoned that "[e]ven though the
statute d[id] not explicitly refer to conspiracy, the IVRA applie[d]
to conspiracies when, as with fraud or deceit, their underlying
purpose was an offense against property.
"
1
With respect to the amount of restitution, which included the
archaeological value of the damage done at the site, the court
ruled that while the inclusion of such amount for determining the
offense level may be appropriate under the teaching of Shumway
to take into account adequately the damage inflicted by a defen-
dant, the amount of restitution under the guidelines was a sepa-
rate inquiry.'" An order of restitution, the court held, needed to
be based on the actual loss suffered and that would not include
archaeological value since that would "require[] the court to specu-
late on the cost of a hypothetical dig that may never have oc-
curred." In the case of Quarrell, therefore, the actual loss was
the cost of restoration and repair.
146
138. Id.
139. Id.; see United States v. Minnemann, 143 F.3d 274, 284 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding
restitution appropriate under Victim Witness Protection Act which had same requirement
where defendant convicted of tax offenses under Title 26 and conspiracy under Title 18).
140. Under the Victim Witness Protection Act, which MVRA supplements, a court has
discretion to order restitution "when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under
this title ... other than an offense described in section 3663A(c)." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A).
141. Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 678.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) provides for mandatory restitution with respect to "an
offense against property under this title . . . including any offense committed by fraud or
deceit,"
143. Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 678.
144. Id. at 679-80.
145. Id. at 680.
146. Id.
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E. Synthesis of Reported Criminal Cases
As reflected in the analysis of the cases discussed above, ARPA
has withstood a number of challenges to the application of its
criminal penalty provisions. Courts have ruled that its terms are
not impermissibly vague or overbroad'47 and that it can be used to
protect archaeological resources on private land if obtained ille-
gally and transferred across state lines.148 Mandatory restitution is
also recognized in an ARPA related prosecution under the Manda-
tory Victim Restitution Act, provided that the defendant also
stands convicted of a qualified offense under Title 18.149 Further,
and along these lines, a new Sentencing Guideline specifically tai-
lored to the protection of cultural heritage resources, which in-
clude archaeological resources under the Act, now governs sen-
tencing for ARPA related offenses. 5 '
The only area where the Act may be said to have encountered a
setback of sorts, from the perspective of law enforcement, has been
in the interpretation of ARPA's mens rea requirement. There, as
discussed above, while the Tenth Circuit held in Quarrell that it is
not necessary for the government to prove that a defendant knew
or had reason to know that he was engaged in the prohibited con-
duct on public or Indian land because that is a jurisdictional ele-
ment, 51 under the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Lynch, the government
must prove that a defendant knew or had reason to know that he
was dealing with an archaeological resource."'
A few points bear consideration with respect to Lynch's ruling.
First, the court in Lynch was concerned with "the casual visitor
who happens to find some exposed artifact[.]"' 53 A defendant who
147. See Austin, 902 F.2d at 744-45.
148. See Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1115-16. But see Ades, supra note 3, at 628-29 (arguing
that "t]o ensure that ARPA remains an effective archaeological resource protection mecha-
nism, Congress should clarify the language of the interstate trafficking provision" and,
short of that, "[r]evision of the uniform regulations to incorporate the term private lands
could remedy any discrepancy as to ARPA's applicability to private lands.").
149. See Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 676-78.
150. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § B1.5. This new guideline incorporates
the value methodology which had been espoused by the court in Shumway.
151. See Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 669-73. In dicta, the court in Quarrell also observed that
the interstate or foreign commerce requirement of section 470ee(c) was a jurisdictional
element. Id. at 670.
152. See Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1145-46.
153. Lynch, 233 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotation omitted); id. at 1144 ("comments [of
bill's sponsor and others] acknowledge the possibility that boy scouts and other 'casual
visitors' might innocently and inadvertently remove an artifact from the public domain.");
id. at 1145 ("With respect to... ARPA ... the legislative history suggests that Congress
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alone or with others is apprehended with tools in federal or Indian
lands performing an unauthorized excavation in the middle of the
day or night presents a different question on the issue of circum-
stantial evidence of knowledge. Furthermore, in those districts
directly impacted by Lynch's ruling, statements by the defen-
dant on this issue obviously will take on an added significance.
Finally, and to the extent practicable, a search warrant may also
assist in obtaining records from a defendant which may relate to
his knowledge of the age of the archaeological resources.'
IV. EMERGING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw RELATING TO THE CIVIL
PENALTY PROVISIONS
Initially, the lack of access to a formal administrative proceed-
ing mechanism involving administrative law judges hampered
enforcement of ARPA's civil penalty provisions outside of the De-
partment of the Interior."' That deficiency, however, was amelio-
was concerned about the risk of penalizing arch[a]ecologically naive visitors to public
lands.").
154. Lynch, of course, only binds the district courts in the Ninth Circuit. See Stinson v.
United States, 102 F. Supp.2d 920, 922 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (district court not bound by deci-
sion of other circuits); United States v. Krasner, 841 F. Supp. 649, 656 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 1983)
(absent guidance from circuit in which district court sits, district court "free to reject hold-
ings.., of sister circuits"); Noto v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 440, 442 n.6 (D.N.J. 1984)
("A district judge is not bound by the appellate decisions outside its own circuit."); cf.
United States v. Brown, 74 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D.W.Va.1998) ("district court is bound by
the precedent set by its Circuit Court of Appeals, until such precedent is overruled by the
appellate court or the United States Supreme Court"). See also Hart v. Massanari, 266
F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Circuit law ... binds all courts within a particular circuit,
including the court of appeals itself.").
155. As observed by three well-regarded commentators:
Situations may arise in which a search warrant is needed during investigation of a
case before it goes to trial. ARPA cases add a few new considerations to the standard
concern in drafting and serving a search warrant. Since artifacts may have been
transferred to coconspirators or since recovered artifacts may need restoration work
before they can be released and such work may take considerable time, there may be
grounds for obtaining a warrant several weeks after a violation is discovered. The
general rule is that search warrants will not be issued where the information is stale,
which usually means more than few days old. The unique circumstances surround-
ing ARPA violations may allow for the acceptance of a longer period after the alleged
violation, as compared with other types of criminal cases, such as those involving
drugs.
Hutt, Jones & McAllister, supra note 14, at 75.
156. Hutt, supra note 11 (recognizing "[t]he lack of an agency [administrative law judge]
impeded active civil enforcement for agencies outside the Department of the Interior"). In
1987, the Department promulgated additional regulations consistent with the uniform
regulations and the purposes of the Act. Hutt, Jones & McAllister, supra note 14, at 32.
These regulations are found at 43 C.F.R. §§ 7.31-7.38 and include procedures for civil pen-
alty hearings which parallel and supplement those contained in the uniform regulations.
See 43 C.F.R. § 7.37.
rated by memoranda of understanding entered into in 1988 and
1990 by the Department of the Interior with the Department of
Agriculture and the Tennessee Valley Authority. 5 7  Notably, to
date, there is no district or circuit court opinion squarely address-
ing the application of ARPA's civil penalty provisions. '
The few administrative decisions which have concerned the ap-
plication of the civil penalty provisions are discussed below. They
all have involved rulings at the administrative law judge level and
have addressed a number of issues, including the level of scienter
necessary to establish a violation, the application of principles of
vicarious liability, the determination of archaeological and com-
mercial value and consideration of factors in mitigation of a pen-
alty, and time limitations affecting the initiation of civil penalty
proceedings.'59 The headings which follow identify some of the
key issues addressed by these opinions.
A. Scienter and Vicarious Liability
In Eel River Sawmills, Inc. v. United States,6 ° petitioners, a con-
tractor and its subcontractor and president, sought administrative
review of assessment notices under ARPA totaling $43,500 for
damages to an archaeological site at Six Rivers National Forest in
California. 6' The damage occurred as a result of unauthorized
excavation and construction of water holes and access roads on the
archaeological site.'62
157. Hutt, supra note 11 (noting that the problem created by lack of access to an admin-
istrative law judge was "rectified with the issuance of Memoranda of Agreement with Inte-
rior executed by the Forest Service and the Tennessee Valley Authority.") (footnote omit-
ted).
158. As previously noted, final administrative decisions resulting in the imposition of a
civil penalty may be appealed to a United States District Court. See 16 U.S.C. §
470fif(b)(1);18 C.F.R. § 296.16(h)(3), (i); 32 C.F.R. § 229.16(h)(3), (i); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(h)(3),
(i); 43 C.F.R. § 7.16(h)(3), (i).
159. Under the regulations, rulings by administrative law judges can be appealed to the
Director of the Office of Hearings and Appeals at the Department of the Interior who shall
then "appoint an ad hoc appeals board to hear and decide the appeal." 43 C.F.R. §
7.37(f)(2).
160. Eel River Sawmills v. United States, Docket Nos. 90-1 & 90-2 (Aug. 10, 1992). A
copy of this decision is on file with the author. See Hutt, supra note 11 at n.6 (stating that
"[t]he first civil matter to utilize the ARPA civil process ... was Eel River").
161. Id. at 1-3.
162. Id. at 3. On the issue of authorization, the judge found that the alleged "common
practice [of] loggers to develop water supplies without the Forest Service's permission
c[ould not] override the plain terms of [Eel River's] contracts requiring the Forest Service's
prior approval." Id. at 7.
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At the administrative hearing, petitioners raised three conten-
tions. First, they argued that the civil penalty provisions did not
apply because they were not aware that archaeological resources
were present on the site they excavated."3 Next, they maintained
that the amount of the penalty assessed should have been lower
because they had not willfully damaged the archaeological site
and they had also performed work to restore it."M Finally, the con-
tractor Eel River argued that it could not be held vicariously liable
for the acts of Western Pacific, its subcontractor.
65
The administrative law judge rejected the argument that peti-
tioners' ignorance of the fact that archaeological resources were
present at the site where the excavation of the water holes and the
access roads was undertaken constituted a defense to the imposi-
tion of civil penalties. 66 The judge ruled that "ARPA and its im-
plementing regulations d[id] not require proof of knowledge or in-
tent to assess civil penalties against a person who violate[d] the
Act by excavating or damaging archaeological resources. 67 In
reaching this conclusion, the judge relied on the plain language of
the statute and the implementing regulations, 68 and also on the
163. Id. at 4-5.
164. Id. at 7-11.
165. Eel River, at 11.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Id. In support of their argument, petitioners relied in part on Attakai v. United
States, 746 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990). In Attakai, members of the Navajo Tribe sought
to enjoin the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs from constructing
livestock watering facilities and fences on portions of the Hopi Indian Reservation as part
of a range management and restoration program. Id. at 1398. They maintained that the
construction activities interfered with the exercise of their religion in violation of the First
Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, and also that said conduct
destroyed objects of religious and archaeological value in violation of several statutes, in-
cluding ARPA. Id. The district court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction inso-
far as the National Historic Preservation Act was concerned and dismissed all other counts,
including the one alleging violations of ARPA. Id. at 1413. In rejecting the ARPA claim,
the district court noted that the archaeologist had testified that there had been no excava-
tion of archaeological resources and that the Act was not applicable to the projects at issue.
Id. at 1410. Contrasting other statutes which plaintiffs alleged had been violated, the court
pointed out that "the Act [wa]s clearly intended to apply specifically to purposeful excava-
tion and removal of archaeological resources, not excavations which may, or in fact inadver-
tently do, uncover such resources." Id.
Petitioners in Eel River relied on this last observation by the court Attakai for the
proposition that ARPA did not apply to "excavations which inadvertently uncover [archaeo-
logical] resources." Eel River, at 5. The administrative law judge found, however, that this
comment was dicta and "contrary to the plain meaning of ARPA and its legislative history."
Id.; see Fein v. Peltier, 949 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D. V.I. 1996) (agreeing that "purposeful exca-
vation" comment in Attakai was "mere dicta").
168. Eel River, at 6. The judge referred to 16 U.S.C. § 4705f(i), which provides in perti-
nent part that "[a]ny person who violates any prohibition contained in an applicable regula-
fact that, as reflected by the criminal penalty provisions, "Con-
gress could have added an element of knowledge or intent to the
civil penalty provisions as well, but declined to do so."169
As to the amount of the penalty assessed, the judge first deter-
mined that he had no power to declare the regulations, under
which that figure was calculated, invalid.7 ° With respect to the
amount itself, the judge found that a total of $43,500 for archaeo-
logical value and cost of restoration and repair, which was ap-
proximately one fourth of the maximum permissible penalty, suf-
ficiently factored in respondents' lack of willfulness and restora-
tion work.'7 '
Finally, with respect to Eel River's contention that it could not
be held vicariously liable for the acts of its subcontractor Western
Pacific, the administrative judge determined that while Eel River
might be liable for breach of contract on account of Western Pa-
cific's activities, it was not liable for the statutory penalties im-
posed on its subcontractor.'72 The judge reasoned that such a con-
clusion was consistent with the rule that penalty statutes should
be strictly construed and also with the provisions of ARPA, which
nowhere indicated that contractors could be held liable for the acts
of their subcontractors.
73
tion... may be assessed a civil penalty," and 36 C.F.R. § 296.4, which tracked the language
of 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a). Id.
169. Id. The judge recognized that ARPA's legislative history indicated that civil penal-
ties were not to "be used to harass citizens in their normal use of the public lands or to
impose heavy penalties on persons who inadvertently violate the regulations in a minor
way." Id. (quoting H.R. No. 96-311, June 29, 1979, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1709). See also Hutt, supra note 11, ("In the case of technical violations of a
permit, agencies must proceed cautiously in seeking sanctions. During the passage of
ARPA, Congress expressed concern that penalties not be used to harass citizens in their
normal use of public land.") (footnote omitted). In the case involving petitioners, however,
the excavations caused major damage and did not represent a normal use of the public
lands. Eel River, at 6.
170. Eel River, at 7.
171. Id. at 11. The judge found that including certain costs as components of both ar-
chaeological value and cost of restoration and repair amounted to double counting and
improperly assumed "that two separate examinations (excavations) of the site would be
conducted to first determine the archaeological value and then the cost of restoration and
repair." Id. at 9. The amount which the judge ultimately affirmed no longer included
these "double" costs. Id. at 11.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Eel River, at 11. After appealing the judge's ruling to the Interior Board of Land
Appeals, petitioners subsequently settled the case. Hutt, supra note 11, at n.6.
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B. Archaeological Value, Commercial Value, and Mitigation of
Penalty
The next significant administrative law case addressing ARPA's
civil penalty provisions was Arizona Silica Sand Co. v. Acting Na-
vajo Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs.'74 In that case peti-
tioner, Arizona Silicon Sand Company (ASSC) had obtained a
permit in 1966 from the Navajo Nation to mine sand at the Navajo
Indian Reservation near Houck, Arizona. 7 5 In 1981, ASSC was
told by the tribe that it should desist with any further mining ef-
forts if it discovered archaeological materials in the course of its
operations in the area over which it was granted the permit.7 6 A
decade later, in 1991, an ASSC employee inadvertently discovered
an archaeological site.' ASSC, however, did not secure or moni-
tor the area and two of its employees, using heavy equipment,
moved dirt onto the site. ' 8 The Navajo Nation Historic Preserva-
tion Office also issued a cease and desist order in 1993 which in
part directed ASSC to erect a fence around the site, but no fence
was put in place until 1994.' ASSC subsequently received a no-
tice of violation for damage to the site 8' and later a notice of as-
sessment with a penalty of $70,672.'18
ASSC requested an administrative hearing and challenged the
assessed penalty on a number of grounds.'82 The administrative
law judge rejected all of ASSC's contentions but deferred ruling on
the validity of the assessed penalty pending further development
of the administrative record on the question of whether mitigating
factors warranted a lower penalty.8 1 Specifically, the judge found
that ASSC was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for
the conduct of its employees"8 and that the notices of violation and
assessment had been issued by the proper parties under the regu-
174. Arizona Silica Sand Co. v. Acting Navajo Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
IBIA 94-186-A (October 21, 1996). A copy of this decision is on file with the author.
175. Id. at 1, 6.
176. Id. at 1, 12.
177. Id. at 2, 12.
178. Id. at 2, 6, 12.
179. Arizona Silica Sand Co., at 6-7.
180. The first notice was issued on April 18, 1994; a second notice was issued on July 7,
1994, and included a proposed penalty in the amount of $70,672. Id. at 7.
181. Id. at 8.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id. at 20.
184. Id. at 12-13, 20. The judge applied Arizona law, which the parties stipulated gov-
erned, and distinguished Eel River on the grounds that it involved a subcontractor and not
an employee. Id. at 12-13.
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lations. 185  She further determined that there was nothing inap-
propriate about the use of commercial value, as opposed to ar-
chaeological value, in a case where there was no intentional dam-
age to the site,18 no artifacts had been removed, and there was no
indication of "commercial profiteering."'87 The judge also found
that while the methodology employed by the government's archae-
ologist to establish the commercial value of the artifacts at the site
was not the most "optimum," it complied with applicable stan-
dards .188
Following the judge's ruling, ASSC submitted additional infor-
mation to the federal land manager explaining why mitigation of
the penalty was appropriate.'89 ASSC maintained that a reduction
was warranted because it had not acted willfully or removed ar-
chaeological resources from the site, remained willing to help re-
store the site, and would suffer a financial hardship if it had to
pay $70,672.19 The land manager found that none of these miti-
185. Id. at 13-15, 20. In the case involving ASSC, the tribe had a contract with the De-
partment of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs to perform archaeological functions. Id.
at 13.
186. Relying in part on Eel River, the judge ruled that "ARPA [wa]s a law that [could] be
viewed as a strict liability statute." Id. at 16.
187. Id. The record established that commercial value had been selected over archaeo-
logical value because it was a lesser amount. Id. at 15. The judge also noted that "[w]hile
it appear[ed] that experts ha[d] their own personal views about when use of one over the
other [wa]s appropriate, and it further appear[ed] that circumstances may be a strong
determinative factor, there [wa]s no one flat rule which direct[ed] or restrict[ed] use of one
or the other values in particular contexts." Id. at 16. And as to including the cost of 'com-
plete curation" as opposed to the cost for a "sampling" as a component of archaeological
value, the judge found that it did not amount to double counting (with values incorporated
in the independent cost of restoration and repair calculation). Id. at 17-18.
188. Id. at 18-19. In assigning the commercial value for the artifacts at the site, the
archaeologist in Arizona Silica Sand Co. selected the comparable prices for such artifacts in
"a gallery in a tourist area." Id. at 18. The judge explained his concern for this procedure
by noting:
I do not find selecting a single artifact price from a single source rather than estab-
lishing a price or price range from an array of sources to be an optimum procedure
under the statute not only because it could lead possibly to unusually high figures or
subjective selectivity in a process that is already recognized by experts as subjective
but also because lack of such data or information effectively nullifies the hearing
judge's ability to exercise fully those powers conferred to reduce, augment or other-
wise adjust assessed penalties as contemplated under 43 C.F.R. Section 7.15(g)(3).
Id. at 18-19.
189. Arizona Silica Sand Co. v. Acting Navajo Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs
(Arizona Silica Sand Co. II), IBIA 94-186-A (April 2, 1997). A copy of this decision is on file
with the author.
190. Id. at 2; see 43 C.F.R. § 7.16(b) (setting forth factor to consider in mitigation).
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gating factors justified a reduction of the penalty and the adminis-
trative judge agreed.19
First, as to petitioner's willfulness, the judge found that the
land manager had acted reasonably in not reducing the amount of
the penalty because ASSC committed more than one violation and
also failed to erect a fence to protect the site for many months in
contravention of a cease and desist order.'9 This same conduct
essentially justified the land manager's decision not to reduce the
penalty even though petitioner had agreed to provide assistance to
restore and protect the site, and never removed any resources
from the site.'93 Lastly, as to the amount of financial hardship as-
sociated with the penalty, the judge again agreed with the land
manager that petitioner had failed to provide any meaningful fi-
nancial data in support of his request for mitigation. 94 While peti-
tioner maintained that in three of the past five fiscal years it had
not made a profit from its operations, the judge concurred with the
land manager's determination that such an earnings history shed
no light on whether petitioner would not be able to obtain a loan
or have to sell essential assets to pay the penalty. 9'
C. Timing Limitations
The last significant administrative decision addressing the ap-
plication of ARPA's civil penalty provisions is Harelson v. Bureau
of Land Mgmt.'96 In Harelson, petitioner, "a long-time collector of
Native American artifacts" discovered a site in 1980 in federal
land in Nevada managed by the Department of the Interior's Bu-
reau of Land Management ("BLM") which subsequently came to
be known as Elephant Mountain Cave.19 7 At the time of the initial
discovery, the cave was "a small slit on the side of the mountain"
but after five years of excavation, it "was a cavern 70 feet wide
and 12 feet high."'98 During that time, petitioner and his then wife
191. Arizona Silica Sand Co. H, at 2. At the time of this determination, a new adminis-
trative judge had been assigned to the case. Id.
192. Id. at 3.
193. Id. at 3-4.
194. Id. at 4.
195. Id. at 4-5.
196. Jack Lee Harelson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Docket No. 97-1 (December 6, 2002).
A copy of this decision is on file with the author.
197. Id. at 7 (internal quotation omitted).
198. Harleson, at 12 (internal quotation omitted).
252 Vol. 42
Winter 2004 ARPA 253
removed countless artifacts and took them home.199 Among the
items they took from the cave were two large baskets, each con-
taining the body of a child (a boy and a girl).2"' After removing the
bodies and assorted artifacts from the baskets, they placed the
bodies in plastic garbage bags, buried them in petitioner's back
yard, and kept the baskets and the artifacts for his collection.20 '
In 1996, petitioner was convicted in Oregon state court of first
degree theft and tampering with physical evidence in connection
with his looting of Elephant Mountain Cave.2 2 That same year,
BLM served petitioner with notices of violation and assessment
containing a civil penalty in the amount of $2,525,316 and peti-
tioner thereafter sought administrative review of that penalty on
several grounds.2 3
The administrative law judge rejected petitioner's contentions
and affirmed the decision of the land manager.2° First, relying on
prior rulings from the Interior Board of Land Appeals, the judge
found that 28 U.S.C. § 2415, which governs the time for commenc-
ing tort and contract actions by the United States, did not affect
when administrative proceedings seeking the civil penalties could
be brought under ARPA. 25 Next, the judge found that the govern-
ment had established by a preponderance of the evidence that pe-
199. Harleson, at 12. Illustrative of the archaeological significance of the cave, a BLM
archaeologist noted that a pair of sandals petitioner pilfered "ha[d] been radiocarbon dated
to 10,000 years ago, making them the oldest footwear ever found in Nevada and among the
oldest in the world." Eric A. Powell, Cave Looter Allegedly Solicits Murder, ARCHAEOLOGY,




202. Oregon v. Harelson, 938 P.2d 763, 764 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). The Oregon Court of
Appeals affirmed those convictions but reversed petitioner's convictions for abuse of a
corpse on statute of limitations grounds. Id. Petitioner's wife was granted immunity and
assisted the government in its prosecution of petitioner. Id. at 765.
203. Harelson, at 1.
204. Id. at 16. The administrative law judge found:
Petitioner failed to obtain the permit required by 43 C.F.R. Section 7.4(a), and over
the course of several years from 1980 to 1985, excavated a cave that was originally a
small slit in the side of the mountain to a cavern that was 70 feet wide and 12 feet
high. Petitioner's unauthorized and illegal excavations destroyed the archaeological
context of the many artifacts taken by Petitioner, and destroyed almost all of the sci-
entific value of the site. Under the circumstances presented by this case, I conclude
that the penalty amount of $2,525,316 is not excessive.
Id.
205. Id. at 10. The judge found that the Board had ruled on numerous occasions "that
statutes establishing time limits for the commencement of judicial actions for damages on
behalf of the United States do not limit administrative proceedings within the Department
of Interior conducted to determine liability and fix the amount the Government claims to be
due.'" Id. at 10 (quoting Marathon Oil Co., 149 IBLA 287, 290 (1999)).
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titioner had violated ARPA by not obtaining a permit prior to ex-
cavate Elephant Mountain Cave and removing archaeological re-
sources from the cave." 6 Lastly, the judge determined that the
amount of the civil penalty assessed by the land manager, which
consisted of $1,758,767 in archaeological value and $766,549 in
restoration and repair was justifiable,"' and he rejected peti-
tioner's contention that the amount of the penalty warranted a
reduction because there had been no loss and he would suffer a
financial hardship if ordered to pay this amount."8
D. Synthesis of Administrative Law Decisions
As demonstrated by the discussion above, to date, there is no
district or circuit court opinion squarely addressing the applica-
tion of any of ARPA's civil penalty provisions."' The three opin-
ions in this area, all emanating from administrative law judges,
shed some light on how, at least at that level, some of the civil
penalty provisions have been interpreted.
In particular, judges have ruled that knowledge or intent is ir-
relevant to establish a violation under ARPA's civil penalty provi-
206. Harelson, at 10. In reaching this conclusion, the court followed the teaching of Eel
River that ARPA provides a strict liability or absolute standard by which civil penalties
may, but need not be assessed, and that the excavations involving Elephant Mountain
Cave, as those in Eel River, caused major damage and did not constitute a normal use of
public lands. Id. at 11.
207. Id. at 13. The land manager arrived at the penalty amount by obtaining estimates
from three reputable archaeological contracting firms, taking the average of the amounts
calculated by the firms for archaeological value and cost of restoration and repair, and then
adding those two amounts. Id. at 4-6. The land manager had also asked the firms to calcu-
late the commercial value of the archaeological resources damaged and destroyed by peti-
tioner's conduct but concluded, applying the regulations, that archaeological value as op-
posed to commercial value was the appropriate measure because "[t]he loss to the American
people from the destruction of the [cave, and the insult to Native Americans from the dese-
cration of the burials in the [ca]ve, far outweigh[ed] the commercial value of the materials
in the illegal action." Id. at 7. Petitioner did not challenge the method employed by the
land manager to arrive at the civil penalty and the judge found the process "rational and
consistent with the governing regulations." Id. at 13.
208. As to the alleged absence of monetary loss, the judge ruled that "[t]he primary
purpose of the civil penalty [wa]s its utility as an enforcement tool, not as a mechanism to
,make whole' those victims who may have suffered monetary damages." Id. at 15. With
respect to financial hardship, the judge acknowledged that while the amount of the penalty
was not insignificant, other than a bare assertion by petitioner that he lacked financial
resources, there was no specific information concerning his financial status to support a
finding of hardship. Id.
209. As previously noted, final administrative decisions resulting in the imposition of a
civil penalty may be appealed to a United States District Court. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f(b)(1);
18 C.F.R. § 296.16(h)(3), (i); 32 C.F.R. § 229.16(h)(3), (i); 36 C.F.R. § 296.16(h)(3), (i) ; 43
C.F.R. § 7.16(h)(3), (i).
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sions.21 They also have held that an employer is not liable for
statutory penalties if its independent contractor violates ARPA,
211
but is liable for such penalties on account of the conduct of its em-
ployees.1 2 The rulings involving vicarious liability naturally are
the product of the particular facts involved in those cases; future
cases may lead to different results.1 3
Another issue addressed by one of the administrative decisions
involved application of the statute limitations. In Harelson, the
judge ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 2415, which governs the time within
which the United States may bring actions for money damages in
contract or tort, did not impose any time limitation on when ad-
ministrative proceedings may be initiated in connection with
ARPA's civil penalty provisions. '4  While the interpretation of
section 2415 to apply to the commencement of a judicial action for
damages and not an administrative action for the purpose of de-
termining liability finds ample support in decisions from the Inte-
rior Board of Land Appeals,1 5 it is important to note that 28
U.S.C. § 2462, which was not discussed by the court and which
governs actions, suits, or proceedings for the enforcement of civil
penalties may be found to provide a time limitation for the com-
210. Harelson, at 11; Arizona Silica Sand Co., at 16; Eel River, at 6. See also Lynch, 233
F.3d at 1145 (contrasting statutory "knowing" requirement applicable to criminal but not
civil violations). A violator's lack of willfulness, however, may be considered as a mitigating
factor in determining whether the amount of the penalty should be decreased. See footnote
38, supra.
211. Eel River, at 11. Citing McCormick v. Nobel Drilling Corp., 608 F.2d 169, 174-75
(5th Cir. 1979) as support, and given the particular facts in that case, the judge in Eel River
applied the well-established principle that an employer generally is not liable for the acts of
its independent contractor in absolving Eel River of liability. Eel River, at 11. The decision
in McCormick relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and past opinions of the Fifth
Circuit applying Mississippi law. Additionally, the judge noted that penalty statutes
"should be strictly construed," and that ARPA did not provide for the imposition of liability
on a contractor for the acts of its subcontractor. Id.
212. Arizona Silica Sand Co., at 12. Applying Arizona law and the rule that an em-
ployer is liable for the acts of an employee, provided they fall within the course and scope of
his employment, the judge in Arizona Silica Sand Co. ruled that ASSC was liable for the
acts of its employee when he dumped dirt on the archaeological site. Id.
213. The legal issues surrounding liability presented by the acts of an independent con-
tractor or an employee are varied. In the context of the imposition of civil penalties under
ARPA, the administrative law judges in Eel River and Arizona Silica Sand Co. applied
state and federal law. See footnotes 211 & 212, supra. While the legal principles governing
the liability of an employer for the conduct of its employee or an independent contractor are
well developed, to the extent state laws vary, different results may be reached administra-
tively when examining the issue of the vicarious liability. The application of federal law
also may present its own variations.
214. Harelson, at 10.
215. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co., 149 IBLA 287, 290 (1999); Cenex, Inc., 145 IBLA 254,
257 (1998); W.A. Moncrief, 144 IBLA 13, 15-16 (1998).
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mencement of administrative proceedings under ARPA.216
Whether, and to what extent the timing limitations of section 2415
may be interposed as a bar against the government if it seeks to
collect the amount of a penalty by instituting a civil action in dis-
trict court has not yet been decided.217
216. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 states:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not
be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim
first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within
the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.
28 U.S.C. § 2462. Courts have interpreted the limitations period in Section 2462 to apply
to the initiation of administrative proceedings whose goal is the imposition of civil penal-
ties. See, e.g., Arch Mineral Corp. v. Babbitt, 104 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1997) (reviewing ad-
ministrative action by Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) link-
ing corporation to company which owed delinquent abandoned mine land penalties and fees
to OSM); 3M Company v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (involving review of Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's assessment of civil penalties for violations of Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act). But the term "penalty" is not defined under Section 2462 and judi-
cially it has been interpreted to mean "a form of punishment imposed by the government
for unlawful or proscribed conduct, which goes beyond the damage caused to the harmed
parties by the defendant's action." Johnson v. S.E.C., 87 F.3d 484, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(emphasis added; footnote omitted); accord Proffitt v. F.D.I.C., 200 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir.
2000); United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, if the
damages recoverable under ARPA's civil penalty provisions are deemed to be remedial in
nature, then an argument could be made that the limitations period of Section 2462 does
not control. Cf. United States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1970) (action to re-
cover sums paid in violation of Anti-Kickback Act not one for enforcement of civil penalty
under Section 2462 since sanctions "designed to make the United States whole by recover-
ing the extra costs that occurred when kickbacks were paid"); SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp.
1117, 1122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ( disgorgement not a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture" within
meaning of Section 2462 since sanction "strictly remedial"). See also Meeker v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915) (discussing meaning of penalty under Section
2462's predecessor).
217. The limitations period which governs the time within which a civil action must be
brought in district court under 16 U.S.C. § 470fffb)(2) to collect a penalty is beyond the
scope of this article. This much, however, appears to be clear. First, the four year limita-
tions period provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) could not apply since it governs "any civil
action arising under an Act of Congress enacted" after December 1, 1990. ARPA was en-
acted in 1979. Second, and in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2415, an initial question presented
is whether a civil action under section 470fffb)(2) to recover a penalty, the "validity and
amount" is not subject to review, is more akin to a suit to collect a judgment, and therefore,
not subject to Section 2415's time limitations. Cf. United States v. Southern Fabricating
Co., 764 F.2d 780, 782 (l1th Cir. 1985) (consent judgment); United States v. Hannon, 728
F.2d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1984) (default judgment). Finally, assuming such an action is not
analogous to a suit on a judgment and that § 2415 provides the controlling period of limita-
tions within which an action must be brought, different periods will apply depending on
whether the action is characterized as sounding in contract or in tort, and whether it is
being brought on behalf of "a recognized tribe, band or group of American Indians[.]" Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Cultural resource crimes continue to take place with frequency
on public and Indian lands throughout the nation.2 8 The trend in
recent years has been away from the hiker who picks up an arti-
fact to the "professional looter"219 who methodically researches the
location of promising archaeological sites and then illegally sells
the resources he discovers supplying networks of dealers and col-
lectors.22 In combating this complex problem, the vigorous en-
forcement of ARPA's tested criminal and civil penalty provisions,
in conjunction with other federal laws, may serve as a deterrent
against those intent on stealing our Native American and national
treasures.
218. See, e.g., U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Nevada Press Release, Three Remaining
Artifacts Looters Sentenced, December 16, 2003 (reporting on sentencing of defendants who
were part of a group which "stole over 11,000 artifacts from 13 archeological sites in Ne-
vada and California between late 1997 and December 2001"), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nv/home/pressrelease/january2004/peterson0l1604.htm. See
also BLM Press Release, $20,000 Reward Offered Following Destruction of Archaeological
Resources, Oct. 15, 2003 (announcing reward for information leading to arrest and convic-
tion of those involved in looting BA Cave Rockshelter, a site registered on the National
Register of Historic Places, located in Worland, Wyoming) available at
http://www.wy.blm.gov/ newsreleases/2003/oct/10-15wfo-reward.htm. See also Ades, supra
note 3, at 628 ("Archaeological sites are constantly targets of unauthorized removal and
excavation, despite efforts by government and tribal agencies."); Cultural Resource Man-
agement in Contemporary Society, at 259 (2000) ("Although the Four Corners area of the
U.S. Southwest has long been a focus of activity and concern, the looting of archaeological
sites in the United States occurs throughout the nation.").
219. Testimony of John Fryar, U.S. Sentencing Commission Public Hearing (Feb. 26,
2002), at 2 (professional looters "will dig at night using the cover of darkness to mask their
activities. They usually park vehicles some distance from the site they are working and
then hike in and carry their tools such as probes, shovels, trowels, flashlights, and
screens."). See also Lesli S. Potter & Bruce Zagaris, Toward a Common U.S. - Mexican
Cultural Heritage: The Need for a Regional Americas Initiative in the Recovery and Return
of Stolen Cultural Property, 5 TRANSNAT'L. LAw. 627, 635 (1992) (noting how "professional
looters employ portable generators, prefabricated huts, earthmoving and excavation equip-
ment, power tools and metal detectors" to obtain resources from sites).
220. See Testimony of John Fryar, supra note 217, at 1-2 (discussing 'dramatic drop in
the instances of looting caused by 'mom and pop' out for a Sunday picnic or damage caused
by boy scout troop out for a day hike" but increase by "hard core looters"); Statement of
Christopher Kearney, supra note 126 (discussing that "recent trend is the theft and damage
of cultural resources by 'professional looters,' hard-core looters who sell the resources for
monetary gain and often have criminal histories, usually drug-related or violence-related").

